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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper focuses on the role played by internationalization in the growth of Chinese 
telecom firms by comparing the three cases from China’s telecom sector – Huawei 
Technologies (Huawei), Zhongxing Telecom Equipment Corporation (ZTE), Datang Telecom 
Technology (Datang).  Faced with a global market that was strongly oligopolistic and 
dominated by Western firms, we show that internationalization strategies triggered by 
resource seeking played different roles in the growth strategies of these three firms.  The 
contrasting fortunes of these firms also underscores the fact that the success of 
internationalization strategies of firms from emerging markets cannot be understood 
without reference to the global competitive environment faced by firms.  
KEY WORDS: Chinese Multinational Enterprise, Internationalization Business Strategy, 
Resource-based View, Telecom Industry  
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Go West for fame and fortune? 
Internationalization in the growth of Chinese telecom equipment firms 
 
As latecomers, multinational enterprises from emerging markets (EM MNEs) are often more 
competitive in terms of cost of labour and natural resource comparing to mature MNEs 
from developed markets. However, most of these companies are global experience and so 
have weak technological and innovation capabilities, inexperienced managerial and 
professional expertise, and show poor governance and accountability by international 
standards (Luo and Tung, 2007).  The growing internationalization of firms from China and 
other emerging markets, despite such handicaps, is thus a phenomenon of some interest 
and one that has received growing attention in the last two years with several scholarly 
works devoted to an analysis of the subject (see Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Luo and Tung, 
2007; Aulakh, 2007; Boisot and Meyer, 2008;  Athreye and Kapur, 2009; Ramamurti and 
Singh, 2009) .   
Athreye and Kapur (2009) point out two peculiar features of international investments by 
Chinese firms.  Outward FDI flows from China have emerged much sooner than expected, 
whether compared to the trajectory of early industrializing nations or more recent cases 
such as South Korea. Second, some of the capital outflows and acquisitions have been to 
developed economies rather than, as is often expected, to less developed economies. 
China’s Lenovo and Haier have made substantial inroads in the US, while its telecom 
equipment firms Huawei, have made investments in Europe. This developed country 
orientation presents something of a conundrum for theorising about FDI in economics and 
management literatures.  Ordinarily economists would not expect labour-rich developing 
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countries to be exporting capital to capital rich developed countries.  Nor does it conform to 
the conventional predictions of the ‘investment development path’ taken by developing 
countries. Traditional theories in international business envisage developing countries 
graduating through various stages, starting from a stage where inward FDI allows domestic 
firms to acquire technology and other manufacturing capabilities, and only graduating to a 
stage where domestic industrial capability allows these firms to export their output and 
eventually to invest overseas, but typically to economies lower down in the stage of 
development.  
So why do firms have a westward orientation in their international in   investments and is it 
really successful?  To understand the answer to this question we study three Chinese firms 
in the telecom equipment sector and their internationalization efforts.  We attempt to place 
the internationalization of the firms in perspective by considering the overall growth 
strategy of the firm.  Lastly, we examine the success or failure of internationalization in 
terms of its contribution to their growth strategy.    
We find a large role for oligopolistic interaction in explaining both the direction of 
international investments by the Chinese firms and also the return on these investments. 
We also find there is tension between the competitive and cooperative aspects of global 
rivalry which influence the firm’s ability to augment its own resource base e.g. of 
technology. We conclude that the relationship between internationalization and 
performance cannot be understood independently of the oligopolistic context of the firms. 
1. Internationalization of Chinese and other emerging market MNEs 
What motivates Chinese firms to venture abroad? A leading approach, the ownership-
location-internalization (OLI) theory (Dunning, 1988), explains the internationalization 
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activity of multinational corporations (MNCs) as their attempts to extend their ownership 
advantages (e.g., proprietary access to a superior production technology or a valuable 
brand) to overseas markets by exploiting locational advantages (locating abroad to access 
low cost inputs or better serve local markets), and internalising the efficiency gains from 
economies of scale and scope by integrating the firm’s activities across borders. In short, FDI 
enables firms to exploit their existing firm-specific assets. This explanation has limited 
traction when analysing the internationalization activity of MNEs from China and other 
developing countries. Typically, these firms have only limited technological or ownership 
advantages to exploit but do enjoy cost advantages.  However to the extent that the cost 
advantages are generic to all suppliers from China, we can expect such advantages to 
dissipate over time and as the global market shares to Chinese firms expand and bid up 
wages in China. Indeed, Rugman and Li (2007) have questioned the long-term sustainability 
of such internationalization with the help of cost advantages in the absence of clear 
ownership advantages.  
Other research on MNEs from emerging economies including China has suggested that 
ownership advantages may lie in ‘capabilities’ beyond proprietary assets such as patents, 
trademarks and brands.  Kumar (2007) has argued that the term ownership advantage 
should be enlarged to include the specific capabilities of developing country firms. Some 
firms from India and China have acquired a niche in ‘frugal engineering’ – the ability to 
manufacture low cost versions of goods for mass markets. Duyster et al (2008) argue that 
Haier have been able to replicate in overseas markets the innovations developed to cater to 
the need of large domestic market. Some Chinese firms may have developed skills in 
managing multi-plant operations across regions that are heterogeneous in their ethnic, 
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linguistic and cultural makeup. It could even be that forms of corporate governance forged 
to cope with restrictive regulatory regimes in domestic economies may have created a 
resilience that provides a comparative advantage in alien markets.   
However, in a major survey of TNCs from developing countries carried out by UNCTAD, a 
majority of firms from China reported seeking overseas markets a major motivation for 
investing abroad. While Chinese manufacturing firms can gain access to international 
markets through exports, in some cases overseas investments are a means of improving 
access to markets or pre-emptively securing access against potential protectionist barriers.   
A second motivation for firms to invest abroad is to secure access to resources, especially 
natural resources and raw materials. As security of access to essential raw materials is 
considered important for economic growth, state-owned enterprises have been at the 
forefront of acquiring ownership stakes in overseas mining and energy sectors. China 
National Petrol Corporation and China National Offshore Oil Corporation are typical firms in 
this category. 
1.1 Motives for internationalization – International resource seeking through global 
cooperation  
The linkage, leverage and learning model developed by Matthews (2006) aims to capture 
the idea that ‘latecomer’ firms will use their overseas investments and global linkages to 
leverage their existing cost advantage and learn about new sources of competitive 
advantage.  If so, internationalization may in fact contribute to the building of ownership 
advantages rather than merely be an outcome of existing advantages. This argument based 
mainly on the experience of East Asian multinational is not necessarily reversing received 
wisdom: empirical research has found that the relationship between ownership advantages 
5 
 
and outward FDI is weak.  Echoing debates from the 1980s, when the OLI model was first 
introduced, it is also suggested that vertical FDI does not need many proprietary ownership 
advantages to be successful.     
The resource based view (RBV) of firms’ competitive positions provides a more general 
account of the “newcomers” in their international expansion (Barney, 1991; Peng and 
Wang, 2000; Peng, 2001; Luo and Tung, 2007).  Peng’s (2001) highlights the factors that lead 
to large sized firms including MNE management, market entries and strategic alliances. Luo 
and Tung (2007) broadly categorized the EM MNEs’ motives as asset seeking and 
opportunity seeking. Assets may include technology know-how, R&D facilities, human 
capital, brands, consumer bases, distribution channels, managerial expertise, and natural 
resources. For instance, Hyundai from South Korea, one of the giants in the auto car 
industry today, has succeeded in NPD by imitative learning process of imported 
technologies in the 1990s (Hyun, 1995). The experience of Hyundai in NPD is a great 
inspiration to how large sized MNEs from developing country can grow to be a large 
exporter. These firms’ resource seeking underpins new strategic options as it has been to 
exploit existing resources.  Therefore, they have to rely on partnerships and joint ventures 
to reduce the risk involved in their leveraged strategies (Mathew, 2006).    
For large sized EM MNEs, one of the reasons of their global success is the strategic alliances 
and state support from their respective home governments. For instance, Tata and Haier 
have benefited from government support, especially during their domestic expansion. The 
Chinese domestic market has been a favourite with local governments who “offered” Haier 
a number of financially ailing companies. Other benefits Haier receives from the Chinese 
government include assistance for R&D, being introduced foreign customers, and cheaper 
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input costs due to supply from subsidized state-owned firms in industries (Duysters et al., 
2009).   
1.2 The global competitive environment and internationalization strategy 
Global oligopolistic markets can also exercise a key influence on the how and where firms of 
internationalization.  Dunning and Pitelis (2004) suggest that global oligopolistic rivalry is an 
important but neglected aspect of theorising in International Business despite the 
importance accorded to it in Stephen Hymer’s early work which was a precursor to the 
whole field of International business.  Chinese and other emerging economy firms have to 
find innovative ways to make space for themselves in markets that were already crowded 
with giant incumbent competitors.  This may involve finding new ways to “complement” the 
strategies of the incumbents, such as through licensing new technologies, to forming joint 
ventures and strategic alliances. It is plausible that it was through the implementation of 
these “complementary” strategies that latecomers were able to win a place in the emergent 
global economy, not on the basis of their existing strengths, but on the basis of their 
capacity to leverage resources from the strengths of others, and through making 
international connections that enable them to do so (Melin, 1992). Luo and Tung (2007) 
show that EM MNEs aim at tapping niche opportunities in advanced markets that 
complement their strengths and also gaining preferential financial and non-financial 
treatment offered by home and/or host governments.  While they seize opportunities in 
other developing countries to leverage their cost-effective manufacturing capabilities they 
also take advantage of opportunities in unrelated but promising areas in high-income 
countries   Lastly, they argue emerging market MNEs try to increase their company size and 
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build their reputation in order to escape from institutional or market constraints and to 
overcome trade barriers into advanced markets.   
1.3 An integrative framework 
Competition and the search for market shares may lead firms to a different rationale and 
execution of internationalization strategy from one motivated by cooperation with rivals 
and the search for international resources to augment firms’ competitive position.  Figure 
one below depicts this tension in oligopolistic markets. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Oligopolistic markets and internationalization strategies  
Quadrant 1 shows an internationalization strategy that is resource seeking in intent but 
where EM MNE eschews competition in favour of collaboration with rivals. Resource 
seeking from many EMs can be put into this category.  Quadrant 3 represents the 
exploitation of national systems of innovation and competitive advantage by EM MNE often 
in collaboration with Western MNEs.  In the case, of Chinese firms, two types of domestic 
resources are particularly advantageous- the ability to command a large pool of labour at 
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low costs and the active encouragement of the State which helps them capture and 
leverage domestic markets.    
Quadrant 2 represents the competition EM MNEs face in their overseas markets. For 
instance, in industries such as mobile phones, electronics and white goods, Chinese MNEs 
now face fierce competition from leading international brands (Child and Rodrigues, 2005).  
In Quadrant 4, emerging market firms face severe competition from global giants and 
aggressive domestic competitors for their domestic resources (i.e. labour, land) and also in 
their domestic markets.   For many Chinese firms, their home base serves as the 
manufacturing centre (components, semi-products and products) for their worldwide 
operations, opportunities, and hence huge profit potential, posed by emerging economies. 
Because global rivals face liabilities of foreignness whereas EM MNEs enjoy home court 
advantage, it is counterproductive for EM MNEs not to capitalize on their home markets and 
home bases (Luo and Tung, 2007). For instance, EM MNEs (such as China’s TCL, Lenovo, 
Chunlan, ZTE, and Haier) have reorganized their home supply or production bases to meet 
their increased global sales for high-end products, or have re-branded their homemade 
products after using foreign acquirees’ technologies and trademarks. 
Thus, this integrative framework helps to understand many known cases of EM 
internationalization and is particularly suited to understanding the internationalization 
actions of non-incumbent EM MNES when competing with their stronger Developed 
Economy rivals in a global oligopoly.  In this study we use the above framework to 
understand the internationalization strategies of leading Chinese telecom firms. 
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  2.  Rationale for choice of cases 
The tradition of scientific method would suggest that an examination of factors that impact 
on international investment and performance could be carried out using survey research 
tools. However, such an approach is appropriate only when impacting factors can be clearly 
and exogenously identified.  We have chosen case studies (Yin, 1994) approach for this 
paper since we expect that the strategies adopted for internationalization depend upon the 
chosen strategy of the firm which also ultimately affects performance and the structure of 
the industry. Secondly we believe the process by which internationalization begins to affect 
performance is as interesting to understand in the context of emerging economies.  There 
are obvious limitations in findings drawn from cases analysis such as, for instance, 
generalizability. However, this approach allows an in-depth analysis of the complex issues in 
the research topic, enabling “The researcher to peep behind the formal aspects of 
organization settings” (Bryman, 1989). Firstly, case study method is especially useful when 
change in the research subject is still ongoing. Secondly, evidence from case analysis can 
serve well in ‘analytic generalisation’ (Yin, 1994). Finally, we believe that the firms examined 
in this paper, may be representative of a relatively new group of technology based 
enterprises from emerging markets (particularly leading hi-tech firms from China, India, 
Russia, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa). 
The telecom industry in many respects represents a microcosm of the changes unleashed 
during the 1980s.  Starting from a situation where national operators owned production and 
transmission of communication services, gradual deregulation saw the globalisation of the 
telecom sector and a segmentation of the market between equipment manufacturers and 
telecom transmission companies.  Many nationally owned operators tried to use the new 
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environment of deregulation to create global markets and many new private companies 
also emerged.  China was no exception.  With a well developed telecommunications 
infrastructure, China was keen to get foothold and eventually a share in the global 
telecommunications market.   
 The three cases selected for study accounted for over half of Chinese telecom market in 
1998 (see table 1 below).  However, we also selected them to illustrate the diversity of 
strategies pursued in order to break into the global market for telecom equipment.  This 
diversity allows us to assess if the internationalization strategy was indeed a better one, 
especially when the internationalizing firms had few advantages they could term firm-
specific. 
Table 1:  Market shares of the case study firms in 1998 (Xin and Wang, 2000) 
Company Capacity (lines) China Domestic Market share (%) 
Huawei 7,000,000 24 
ZTE 5,100,000 20 
Datang 1,560,000 7 
 
The data collection process was carried out in two phases. The first phase, from May 2008, 
involved collecting and reviewing secondary data from annual report, official released 
material, official website source, academic research literatures related to Huawei and ZTE, 
as well as official data from UNCTAD, World Bank, MOFCOM and etc. This preliminary 
information collection enabled the authors to identify the key issues for the research, 
forming a basis for the design of the semi-structured interview. The second phase, the first 
involving primary data collection, was carried out in Huawei and ZTE’s headquarter in 
Shenzhen, China in July 2008. We formally interviewed eight middle managers from Huawei 
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and ZTE. We also conducted some follow-up interviews in March, 2009.  All the interviewees 
were involved in R&D projects and have been worked for these companies over 5 years. 
They were also invited to verify the information provided in prior interviews and clarify 
issues in contradiction and confusion. Participation in the interviews was voluntary with 
respondents given anonymity. To analyse the case study evidence, the strategy adopted for 
this study is to follow the proposed theoretical framework on the internationalization and 
R&D strategies that led to the case studies. Interview data and field notes were analysed 
using the standard interview technique (Yin, 1994). 
3. International investment and performance of Chinese enterprises: three case studies 
3. 1:  Huawei Technologies- the aggressive globalizer 
With revenues of over 23.3 billion USD by the end of 2008, and as the third largest applicant 
under the patent cooperation treaty (PCT) of the world intellectual property organization 
(WIPO), Huawei Technologies Corporation (Huawei) is the most successful of Chinese 
telecom enterprises.  Huawei provides telecommunications network products (mainly 
routers) for businesses and over one billion users worldwide. It has set up over 100 branch 
offices of which 14 are R&D centres.  Its R&D centres are located in Bangalore (India), Silicon 
Valley and Dallas (U.S.A.), Stockholm (Sweden), Moscow (Russia), and Beijing, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen in China, and it also has 29 worldwide training centres.  Table 2 below summarises 
the important milestones in Huawei’s evolution. 
Table 2 Milestones in Huawei’s corporate evolution 
2008: Recognized by BusinessWeek as one of the world’s most influential companies;  Ranked No. 3 by 
Informa in terms of worldwide market share in mobile network equipment  
2007:  Establishes joint venture with Global Marine, to provide end to end submarine network solutions;  A 
partner to all the top operators in Europe at the end of 2007  
2006: Establishes Shanghai based joint R&D Center with Motorola to develop UMTS technologies; Introduced 
new visual identity (VI). The new VI reflects our principles of customer focus, innovation, steady and 
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sustainable growth, and harmony. 
2005: Selects as a preferred telecoms equipment supplier and signs Global Framework Agreement with 
Vodafone; Selects as a preferred 21Century Network (21CN) supplier by British Telecom (BT) to provide multi 
service network access (MSAN) components and optical transmission equipment  
2004: Establishes joint venture with Siemens to develop TD SCDMA solutions ; Achieves first significant 
contract win in Europe valued at over USD25 million with Dutch operator,  
2003: Establishes joint venture with 3Com focusing on enterprise data networking solutions  
2002 : international market sales reaches USD552 million  
2001: Divests non core subsidiary Avansys to Emerson for USD750 million;  Establishes four R&D centers in 
the United States;  Joins International Telecommunications Union (ITU)  
2000:  Establishes R&D center in Stockholm, Sweden; USD100 million generates from international markets  
1999 : Establishes R&D centre in Bangalore, India, which achieves CMM level 
1997: Launches wireless GSM based solutions;  Expands into metropolitan areas of China in Year 1998  
1995: Generates sales of RMB1.5 billion in Year 1995, mainly derived from rural markets in China  
1992: Initiates R&D and launches rural digital switching solution  
1990: Embarks on independent research and commercialization of PBX technologies targeting hotels and 
small enterprises  
1988 :Establishes in Shenzhen with as sales agent for Hong Kong company producing Private Branch 
Exchange (PBX) switches 
Source: Huawei’s milestones (http://www.huawei.com/corporate_information/milestones.do) 
Established in 1988 in Shenzhen, Huawei was started as a private enterprise by Ren Zhenfei, 
with a seven-person investment of RMB20,000 ($2,400). Huawei was involved in reselling 
telephone switchboard before manufacturing its own products.   In 1990, Huawei invested 
its entire product reselling profit into research and development (R&D) of its own telephone 
switches with a view to commercialisation. Its first space-division switching product HJD-48 
was developed through a mixture of imitation and innovation. While most imported digital 
switches were sold in China at more than $200 per line, Huawei’s HJD-48 was sold at less 
than half of that price. This made HJD-48 one of the best-selling space-division switches in 
the country at the time.  (Xing, 2005). In 1992, Huawei launched the first large-scale digital 
program-control switch developed in China by independent design and development.  Its 
revenues in the same year reached 100 million RMB. Huawei then decided to put all capital 
into the R&D of C&C08 switch -- the key product helping Huawei set up its leading position 
in China telecom market. (Huawei 01, 2008).   
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China’s telecommunications market is one of the largest in the world, and liberalisation of 
the Chinese economy has attracted all of the global telecommunication giants into China. As 
a result, ‘the best food has all been eaten up by the global giants and what we can do is to 
have those left over’. Huawei therefore attacked the markets which global giants were 
unwilling or unable to occupy such as the remote rural China and low to medium end global 
market (Rui and Yip 2007). To compete with top foreign telecom equipment suppliers that 
had entered the Chinese market consequent upon liberalisation at the beginning of 1990s, 
Huawei initially focused its sales on the Chinese rural regions. This allowed Huawei to 
achieve economies of scale, built up to a efficient size and also gradually built up its own 
brand name and market foundation in those rural regions.  Gradually, Huawei started to 
penetrate into cities and then global markets in emerging economies.  
In the meantime, development of the telecommunications industry was also considered an 
important and urgent objective of China’s economic reforms. As Huawei was one of the 
biggest players in the telecom industry in China, the Chinese government strongly 
supported the development of Huawei through favourable policy and subsidies on capital. 
However, despite considerable state sponsorship and aid, Huawei remained a private 
company.  Though there is debate about exactly how private is Huawei and speculation 
about the shareholdings of state telecom operators, there is very little doubt that the 
founder exerts strong control over the direction and strategies adopted by the company, 
including its global strategy.  In this sense Huawei remains very private and different from 
other large state-owned companies, including its main rival ZTE. 
By 1996, Huawei achieved annual revenue of 2.6 billion RMB- almost 26 times its revenue in 
1992—thus positioning as the leading telecom equipment supplier in China. However, 
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Huawei’s R&D in this period (1990-96) was based upon “re-development of imported 
technologies” or reverse engineering. Competing with top players in the telecom industry, 
Huawei realized its competitive disadvantage due to poor technological capacity and started 
to invest heavily on innovation and R&D. They stressed the development of high-end and 
mid-range technologies through participating in international R&D cooperation and also 
setting up independent R&D system. 
Huawei started its internationalization journey with the twin aims of seeking global 
technological capability while also leveraging its core competences in its domestic Chinese 
market.   To this end, Huawei has adopted a ‘walking on two legs strategy’ typical of other 
successful Chinese firms (Fu 2007, Duysters etc. 2009).  They developed different 
internationalization strategies towards developed countries and developing countries. In 
emerging markets, they avoided competition from MNEs from the developed world and 
leveraged their cost effective switches that had proved popular in the Chinese domestic 
market. For instance, in 1997, Huawei set up the joint venture (Beto-Huawei) in Russia for 
the large potential market. A few years later, Russia became the major revenue source of 
Huawei in the overseas market. Cheap R&D resources and relatively low labour cost in these 
countries also helped Huawei to achieve fast R&D localization.  In the developed countries, 
Huawei’s  internationalization strategy shows the characters of absorbing advanced 
technology, focusing on customer service, and offering high quality products. 
In 2003, Huawei faced increasing competition from other low-cost EM MNEs (i.e. from 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. To compete effectively with rivals from other EM MNEs, 
Huawei had to develop specific advantages that stemmed from differentiation.  Huawei 
realized that its low-cost strategy for attaining global market shares was not sustainable in 
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the face of such competition. To compete effectively, Huawei was willing to customize 
products and solutions for the requirement of every customer. In fact, this is the most 
prominent characteristic that differentiates Huawei from the western telecom MNEs such as 
CISCO and JUNIPER that offer relatively fixed solutions. This unique characteristic brought 
Huawei the 200 million Euro Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) contract 
from Telfort in Netherlands in 2004, the very first WCDMA contract in Europe. In general 
contract sales have grown rapidly as shown in Figure 1 below. In 2008, its contract sale from 
international markets occupies 75% of its total sales (17.48 billion USD).    
Figure 2:  Huawei’s global and domestic sales (2004-2008) 
 
Source: Huawei’s financial highlights (http://www.huawei.com/corporate_information/financial_highlights.do) 
Since the telecom markets in Europe and North America occupy 61.3% of the total 
worldwide telecom spending in 2007 (IDC, 2007) this represents a very large market in 
terms of value. Through joint venture and cooperation with European telecom giants 
including Siemens and Marconi, Huawei entered European market. Europe is becoming the 
main revenue source of Huawei’s overseas sales.   The performance in US markets has been 
less strong and here Huawei  has also been embroiled in patent infringement disputes. In 
2003, Cisco filed a lawsuit alleging that Huawei had illegally copied its equipment.  Though 
the two companies settled out of court, the negative publicity was damaging to Huawei. 
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Huawei has tried to maintain an average annual R&D intensity of 10% of total revenue, 
matching levels of R&D spend in leading telecom enterprises such as Motorola, Alcatel 
(Brian, 2007).   IN 2007, 48% of Huawei’s 68,000 employees were dedicated to R&D. To 
learn advanced technologies and management systems in developed countries, Huawei has 
set up R&D centres in the Silicon Valley and Dallas (U.S.A.), Stockholm (Sweden). Through 
accessing world-leading talents, advanced R&D infrastructure and fertile research 
atmosphere, Huawei enhanced its R&D and new product development. The technology 
clusters and science parks in those locations are often bounded to a mass of research 
institutes. The effect of technology clusters and alliances have significant positive impact on 
Huawei’s technology innovation.   However, as their founder, Ren Zhefei points out their 
successes have been modest: 
“During the past 18 years, Huawei has been investing a minimum of 10% of our annual 
revenue into R&D, especially during the last few years, we had more than 25,000 employees 
and investment of seven or eight billion yuan (about 1 billion US dollar) dedicated to R&D 
activities. However, so far we have not had one single original product invention. What we 
achieved is advancing our capacity of improving and integrating the function and feature of 
the products invented by the western companies. ….In fact, we also have bottleneck 
constrains in technology even though in project actualization”  
(Ren, 2006  as quoted in Rui and Yip 2007, page 17). 
Consistent with Luo and Tang’s (2007) EM MNEs’ international expansion theory, Huawei’s 
strategic goals during its internationalization are to absorb knowledge (asset-seeking) and 
seek new large markets (opportunity-seeking). Take Huawei’s R&D centre in Silicon Valley of 
the U.S. as an example, large number of famous ICT enterprises located their R&D centres 
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there. According to one of our interviewees (who had worked in the Silicon Valley of the U.S 
for nearly two years), Huawei’s employees have opportunities to access and exchange 
advanced technologies and R&D resources that are not available in China. In addition, 
Huawei’s experienced U.S. local employees can share their explicit and tacit knowledge with 
their Chinese colleagues there. Through working together as a team, knowledge (tacit and 
explicit) sharing between employees from different nationalities facilitates mutual 
complementation of their advantages to upgrade Huawei’s comprehensive strength in its 
R&D system. After half or one year’s work experience in the R&D centre in the USA, those 
Chinese employees go back to China and upgrade the R&D capacity in China.  New 
knowledge will be spread all over the world through their subsidiaries. Therefore, during its 
internalization process, Huawei is able to acquire the advanced R&D resources from 
developed countries and combine them with its existing technology advantage to form new 
ownership advantages, and then spread it globally. 
3.2:  Zhongxing Telecom Equipment Corporation- the late globalizer  
Established in 1985 in Shenzhen, three years earlier than Huawei, ZTE is a state owned 
company.  It was started by a handful of state owned companies affiliated to the Ministry of 
Aerospace Industry and has grown along with China’s big phone companies China Mobile 
(previously China Telecom) and China Unicom who are also ZTE’s top customers. ZTE 
manufactures handsets, base stations switches and networking gear and counts Nokia, 
Samsung and Motorola among its rivals. ZTE president Yin Yamin concedes that they have 
bigger names but “we don’t think we are inferior to them.  We don’t think there is a big 
difference” (Business Week 2005).   
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This confidence is not without reason.  For comparable products ZTE prices are estimated to 
be between 25-90% less than those of western rivals (Economist, 2008).  ZTE was also the 
first Chinese telecoms equipment provider to attain ISO9001 quality standard certificate and 
is more ‘public’ than its better known rival Huawei.  In 1997, ZTE was listed on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange in China. In 2004, it was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as the first 
A to H listed Chinese enterprise. As a listed company, it is preferred by analysts and 
customers and has had little problem in raising money.  Table 3 below shows the important 
milestones in ZTE’s history.   
Table 3 Milestones in the evolution of ZTE 
2008: ZTE Inks 1.33 Billion RMB CDMA Contract with China Telecom; ZTE Opens New Office in Bonn, Germany 
2007: ZTE Showcases 2M TD-HSDPA Technology 
2006: ZTE Releases Smart IP Solution; ZTE Passes IBM Interoperability Test 
2005: Joined the league of global telecoms giants by teaming up with Alcatel, Ericsson, France Telecom and 
Portugal Telecom; Became China's largest wireless equipment provider with a global wireless capacity 
exceeding 100 million lines 
2004: Listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as the first A to H listed Chinese enterprise;  
Launched the world's first CDMA2000-based digital trunking technology – GoTa (Global open Trunking 
architecture); Provided telecoms services for the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens – ADSL system covered 16 
facilities throughout the event; Made the first 3G call in Africa over a ZTE UMTS network in Tunisia 
2003: Strategic emphasis on international business, with the number of international marketing staff increased 
by over 100%; Became the largest CDMA system provider to BSNL, India's largest telecoms services company, 
and constructed Africa's largest CDMA WLL network in Algeria 
2002: Established ZTE handsets as a strategic product and a new source of revenue growth; Partnered with 
Intel (China) to develop 3G wireless and wireless LAN integration communications technologies and equipment 
for CDMA2000 and UMTS 
2001: Constructed ZTE's first CDMA network for China Unicom, with a capacity of up to 1.1 million lines; 
Constructed the world's first Softswitch network for China Netcom 
2000: Launched the world's first CDMA handset with detachable SIM card; Successfully put through the first 
CDMA2000 1x call using ZTE equipment 
1999: Launched ZTE189 dual-frequency handset, the first Chinese dual-frequency product with Chinese-owned 
intellectual property; First deployed the ZTE ZXMVC3000 video conferencing system in an overseas market, in 
Kenya;  Established first overseas office, in Islamabad, Pakistan 
1998: Won a US$95 million turnkey bid in Pakistan, the first large-scale overseas telecoms project contracted 
with a Chinese telecoms company; Opened the company's first R&D institute in the USA, developing software, 
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switching and CDMA2000 1x technologies 
1997: Listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China 
1996: Started transition to a multi-product R&D strategy, embracing wireless switching, transmission, access, 
videoconferencing and power supply systems  
1985: Founded Zhongxing Semiconductor Co. Ltd., the predecessor of ZTE Corporation in Shenzhen, China 
Source: ZTE’s history (http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/main/about/Intro/overall/index.shtml?catalogId=12070) 
 
With the support from Chinese government, ZTE was the first telecom company to go 
abroad and it started its internationalization journey earlier than Huawei. In 1998, ZTE won 
a US$95 million turnkey bid in Pakistan, which was the first large-scale overseas telecoms 
project contracted with any Chinese telecom company. In the same year, to learn advanced 
technologies and management systems form developed countries, ZTE opened its first R&D 
institute in the USA, developing software, switching and CDMA2000 1x technologies. In the 
following year, it established its first overseas office in Islamabad, Pakistan. Despite this 
early start, ZTE was a slow and late internationalizer. Their big push for internationalization 
came after China’s accession to the WTO in 2005 and in response to pressure from the 
Chinese policy.   
Given the easy availability of investment finance both due to its dual stock market listing 
and on account of being a State-owned enterprise this is surprising indeed. In an interview 
in 2005 the chairman Mr. Hou Weigui explained their hesitant internationalization as 
follows: “….. If we go globalised aggressively, we will face huge risk and pressure from 
competition. So we have to know our capability and evaluate the financial risks precisely. 
Otherwise, we will be gambling. We have been doing international business for nearly 10 
years. We started small, with low cost business, and now we can increase the scale slowly… 
Our biggest challenge in globalising is the shortage of human resource in international 
business. The shortage of international talents and the localization in host countries is the 
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key problem we have not solved. …………”  “Before 2004, we only have one department for 
international business, now we have two.… We named 2005 as our international year. We 
are facing a lot of challenges and there are lots things to do, especially in absorbing talented 
human resource internationally. We are not doing enough at the moment. I hope we will 
have a breakthrough on this in 2005. If we can solve this problem, we will have a 
breakthrough in our international markets…….” (As cited in Fan, 2005) 
Initially (before 2005) ZTE’s internationalization focussed mainly on emerging markets in 
Asian and North African countries.  Corruption allegations followed this push most notably 
about award of contracts to ZTE in Ethiopia and Phillipines.  More recently, ZTE has 
established strategic cooperation agreements with leading telecoms giants such as Portugal 
Telecom, France Telecom, Alcatel, Ericsson and Nortel in NGN and mobile systems, with 
Hutchison in 3G, and with Marconi in optical transmission systems. The corporation has also 
launched joint laboratory partnerships with Texas Instruments, Intel, Agere Systems, 
HHNEC, IBM, Microsoft (China), Qualcomm, Huahong NEC and Tsinghua University. Similar 
to Huawei, ZTE undertaken technological research alliance projects with 50 academic 
institutions throughout China, where it is also a fully fledged member of the China 
Communications Standardisation Association (CCSA).   ZTE now has 14 wholly owned R&D 
centres and Institutes across North America, Europe and Asia. International standards such 
as CMM and CMMI are strictly applied across all ZTE R&D management processes. Using 
these scientific management mechanisms and shared technology platforms, ZTE has 
standardised its R&D processes, shortening R&D periods, reducing costs, optimising design 
flows and guaranteeing the performance of new products. The company's commitment to 
21 
 
innovation ensures that its products stay at the leading edge of modern communications 
technology. 
Figure 3 shows ZTE’s contract sales from 2004 to 2008.  We can see from figure 3 that 
before 2005, ZTE’s marketing strategy still focuses on China’s domestic market. Competing 
with other telecom giants, for instance Huawei, ZTE’s sales performance is not very 
encouraging between 2005 and 2006 (see Figure 3). Starting from 2006, ZTE  changed its 
internationalization strategy. Its sales performance was improved dramatically. By the end 
of 2008, its international sales alone have reached 3.94 billion USD, which is more than its 
total sales in 2006.  In 2007, the Group’s revenue from its international operations grew 
94.83% to RMB20.090 billion and accounted for 57.77% of its total revenue, which was 
13.35 percentage points higher compared the previous year. Growth of revenue from its 
international sales was driven by continued revenue growth in emerging markets and 
increased sales in developed countries (ZTE report, 2007). The Group’s revenue from its 
domestic operations amounted to RMB14.687 billion in 2007, representing a year-on-year 
growth of 13.83%.  
Figure 3 ZTE’s global and domestic sales (2004-2008) 
 
Source: ZTE corporate annual report 2004 – 2008 
(http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/main/about/Investor%20Relation/report/index.shtml?catalogId=12075)  
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As of August 2005, ZTE had applied for around 3000 national or international patents, 90% 
out of which are innovation patents with associated intellectual property rights. In addition 
it has been associated with a number of new products.  In 2000, ZTE launched the world's 
first CDMA mobile phone with detachable SIM card. This was followed in 2004 by the launch 
of the world's first CDMA-based digital trunking technology - GoTa (Global open Trunking 
architecture system) which included many technologies based on ZTE-owned intellectual 
property. The high performance of the GoTa system strengthened ZTE's reputation as a 
leading developer of CDMA technologies. Core technologies developed by ZTE for the GoTa 
system were the first to be licensed to overseas vendors such as Nortel and Motorola by a 
Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturer—perhaps in recognition of the 
superior commercialisation abilities of their rivals. 
3.3: Datang Telecom Technology - the ‘non-global’ company 
Datang Telecom Technology Co.,Ltd. is a high-tech enterprise share-held by the CATT (China 
Academy Telecommunication Technology). It was founded in 1998. In October of the same 
year, the company’s stock "Datang Telecom" (Stock Code: 600198) was listed in Shanghai 
Stock Exchange.  Before 1998,  Datang was a Hi-Tech company owned by CATT.  
As one of the leading domestic Hi-Tech enterprises of telecom industry, Datang established 
manufacturing bases in Beijing, Chengdu, Xi’an, Tianjin, Shanghai and Shenzhen, and has set 
up a market network and many customer service centres all over China, and has established 
a robust service support system. Datang’s products and service today have achieved wide 
coverage in over 30 provinces, cities, municipalities and Macao Special Administrative 
Region (Datang, 2008).   
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However, comparing to Huawei and ZTE, Datang’s strategy only focused on Chinese 
domestic market aiming to capture a monopoly position in this large market through use of 
a proprietary standard.  Thus, Datang did not really “go global” when Chinese government 
started encouraging Hi-Tech enterprises’ internationalization in the late 1990’s.  Instead it 
was involved in the development of the 3G standard TD-SCDMA which is a standard 
promoted by the Chinese Government and all the IPR surrounding this standard is largely 
held in China.  In January 2006, the People's Republic of China formally announced that TD-
SCDMA would be the country's standard of 3G mobile telecommunication.  The adoption of 
the TD-SCDMA is an attempt to avoid paying large patent fees to western operators whilst 
at the same time leveraging the strengths of China’s large domestic markets for mobile 
phones. 
The timeline for deployment of the network in China was announced, stating pre-
commercial trials would take place starting after completion of a number of test networks in 
select cities. These trials ran from March to October, 2006, but the results were apparently 
unsatisfactory. In early 2007, China Mobile was instructed to build commercial trial 
networks in eight cities, and the two fixed-line carriers, China Telecom and China Netcom, to 
build one each in two other cities. Construction of these trial networks was scheduled to 
finish in 2007, but delays have meant that construction was not complete until early 2008.   
These problems are reflected in the slow growth of Datang’s sales.   In a technology 
intensive industry such a lag is also costly in terms of the human capital losses.  Table 4 
below shows the slow exodus from the company of employees with PhD and Master 
Qualification.  According to one of our interviewees (a manager in Huawei who used to work 
for Datang), most them have left Datang to other giant telecom firms (i.e. Huawei).   
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Table 4:  Datang’s employees 2001 – 2008  
Employees Number  2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
Total 3016 2836 3009 3054 3070 3482 4183 4962 
PhD 10 11 14 26 27 27 61 78 
Master 401 310 391 362 333 347 895 1365 
Source: NETEASE stock (600198) company profile 
(http://quotes.money.163.com/corp/1026/code=600198.html) 
4. Discussion of case studies 
The three case studies of three leading telecom firms in China shows the different 
importance accorded internationalization in the growth strategy adopted by the three 
leading Chinese telecom firms.   In this section, we will discuss the causes and consequences 
of this variability in strategy. 
4.1: The global competitive environment and internationalization strategy 
From a situation where national markets were dominated by state owned operators who 
produced and transmitted communication services, the telecommunications industry since 
the 1980s has become a segmented global oligopoly where a handful of producers 
dominate the market for telecom equipment and also own the technology surrounding their 
manufacture.  As the Chinese economy liberalized, these manufacturers came into the 
Chinese market and impelled a competitive response from the Chinese telecom 
manufacturers.  Their technological strengths not only signalled the technology gap 
between what Chinese firms could achieve relative to the best available in the world, but 
given the oligopolistic nature of the global market those technological strengths also 
constituted effective barriers to entry.  The Chinese firms on the other hand had two 
important strengths - a very low cost manufacturing capability and potential access to a 
large domestic market.  In terms of our integrative matrix, western MNEs positioned 
themselves in quadrants Q1 or Q4 of the matrix. 
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The response of the three dominant Chinese firms to the competitive threats posed by 
foreign MNEs was different. Huawei chose to go abroad and close the technology gap whilst 
at the same time avoiding head-on competition with the foreign MNEs- both in China and 
abroad, which fits to Quadrant 1 (see Figure 4).  Though Ramamurti and Singh (2009) 
characterize them as a global first-mover as the quote from Ren reported earlier indicates 
(see Section 3.1), Huawei is yet to achieve major innovative breakthroughs.  However, their 
strategy has elements of a low-cost partnership strategy. By working cooperatively with 
Western firms Huawei’s  strategy had the merit of making survival easy but it still took a lot 
of agility and dedicated investment to close the technology gap by developing own 
capabilities.   
In contrast, ZTE understood the low cost strategy extremely well and went after building a 
large scale first.  Initially they chose to serve the large domestic market well, and alter 
extended itself in other similar markets.  They used the domestic science and technology 
infrastructure to build their technological strengths.  This brought them in head on 
competition with foreign MNEs and as we noted charges of corruption and improper 
conduct have dogged ZTEs market expansion.  Since 2006, they have adopted a more 
collaborative strategy and this has allowed them to grow their revenues.  They have been 
willing to sell their handset as ‘white goods’ to various operators (such as Australia’s 
Telestra, Vodafone and Telefonica) rather than act as OEM manufacturers to the existing 
handset giants like Nokia, RIM and Apple whom they regard as their competitors.   
Datang, in contrast, has sought to develop its own standard and avoid technological 
dependence on foreign companies.  Its strategy does not yet have a place for 
internationalization and it has been supported in its endeavours by the Chinese State.  It is 
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directly in competition with Western MNEs for the Chinese market and as such occupies 
Quadrant 4 of our matrix. 
 
Figure 4:   internationalization strategies of Chinese firms in the telecom market  
The mode, sequence and direction of international investments by Huawei and ZTE have 
also been very different and this is shown in Table 5.  The steady international investments 
of Huawei contrast strongly with the post 2005 bunching of investments by ZTE.  There are 
also differences in the destination countries of investment.  Huawei has had a longer more 
consistent presence in the developed market economies of the West. ZTE in contrast has 
scoped developing country markets more.  Lastly, Huawei’s investments have all been 
Greenfield while ZTEs have been more mixed- consisting of acquisitions, Turnkey contracts 
and Greenfield investments.  To the extent that Greenfield investments reflect investment 
in assets specific to the company, this is an indication of the serious intent that Huawei has 
had in using its internationalization to build its own intangible assets and strengths. 
 
Table 5: Sequence of international investments  
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YEAR Huawei ZTE 
1997 Russia    
1999 Thailand, Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Argentina, Brazil, Perú  
 
Pakistan 
 
2000 Indonesia , Egypt, Mozambique,  Colombia, 
 México  
 
Iran 
 
2001 India , Singapore, Madagascar, Namibia, 
Zambia, Venezuela, The UK & Ireland, Germany,  
Sweden, Huawei North America  
 
Congo, Colombia, México 
 
2002 Mauritius   
2003 Mauritania, France  
 
Brazil, Algeria, North America  
 
2004 Australia, Kenya, Italy  
 
Egypt, Tunisia, Russia, Nigeria 
 
2005 Japan, The Netherlands  
 
India, Bulgaria, Romania, France, Vietnam, 
Poland, Czech, Hungary, Turkey, Libya 
 
2006  Estonia, Spain, Morocco, Greece (JV),  UK, 
Germany 
 
2007  Malaysia (JV) 
Bolivia 
 
Source: Huawei (http://www.huawei.com) and ZTE (http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/main/News%20Events/Press%20Clipping/) 
From our case studies, we also see that both Huawei and ZTE developed different 
internationalization strategies towards developed countries and developing countries. In the 
developed countries, their internationalization strategy shows the characteristics of 
absorbing advanced technology, focusing on customer service, and offering high quality 
diversified products.  Investing in the developing markets avoided the competition from the 
developed world. In the regions with relatively less developed telecom industry, Chinese 
enterprises have more advantages in technologies and are able to satisfy the demand of the 
markets there. Cheap R&D resources and relatively low labour cost in these countries will 
help them to achieve fast R&D localization. Their investment in developing countries shows 
the characters of searching potential markets, less labour (including R&D) cost and 
comparative technology advantage. 
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A comparison across the three cases also illustrates the difficulties of assigning a role to 
state in the internationalization of investment by Chinese firms.  Two of the three 
enterprises were state-owned and given the special status of telecom as a thrust sector all 
three firms received state sponsorship of their efforts.  Yet, as our case studies indicate the 
favourable treatment by the State did not necessarily imply success in overseas 
investments.  ZTEs inability to internationalize because of its problems with localising the 
management team, discussed in Section 3.2 earlier, show that state support may not be 
sufficient to promote international investments. 
 4.2: Internationalization strategy and firm performance 
We turn now to considering how the performance of firms as measured by the rate of 
growth of sales revenues (Figure 4), export market shares (Figures 2 and 3) and patent 
holdings (Table 6). 
Figure 4: Relative growth of sales (1998-2008)
 
Source: Huawei (http://www.huawei.com), ZTE (http://www.zte.cn.com), Datang (http://www.datang.com), NETEASE 
Stock Information: Datang (600198), ZTE (000063) 
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At first glance, Figure 3 suggests that Huawei the more internationalized company also 
appears to do better in terms of rate of growth and also export shares.  Although ZTE does 
better than Datang but is nowhere near it’s more famous rival.  The superior performance of 
Huawei probably underscores the importance of western markets in terms of value.  As 
noted earlier, Europe and North America account for over 60 % of the world telecom 
equipment market by value.  By internationalizing into similar income markets during the 
late nineties, ZTE also chose to operate in a lower value market and this is reflected in the 
lower share of the value of exports and the slower growth of overall value of sales. The ROG 
of sales of Datang reflects what firms could expect if they relied upon the growth of the 
domestic market alone. However, should the Chinese standard take-off, dating may well 
find itself in an assured monopoly reaping huge profits. 
To what extent have the telecom enterprises been able to absorb the advanced R&D 
resources (tangible and intangible) from developed countries and combine them with its 
existing technology advantage to form new ownership advantages, and then spread it 
globally? Developing technological innovations overseas can also help Chinese firms to gain 
home and   host government approval, and the acceptance of local communities.  To 
investigate the impact of internationalization on the innovative capacity of the three firms 
under study we looked at the overall patent performance of these firms and the share of 
their China based  patents ( as measured by the location of inventors) in Table 6. 
Table 6: Internationalization and technological capability 
 Patent Office Huawei ZTE Datang 
Pre 1998 
USPTO 11  23 0 
EPO 322 0 15 
SIPO 77 230 344 
After 1998 
USPTO 121 41 0 
EPO 28683 11124 1049 
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SIPO 22388 13999 1467 
Patents Applied from 
China ( Pre 1998) 
USPTO 13 1 0 
EPO 20426 748 2 
Patents Applied from 
China ( After 1998) 
USPTO 104 8 0 
EPO 7476 9773 999 
Source: USPTO (http://patft.uspto.gov/), EPO (accessed from UK 
http://gb.espacenet.com/search97cgi/s97_cgi.exe?Action=FormGen&Template=gb/EN/home.hts ) SIPO 
(http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/zljs/ ) 
We see that the period of internationalization (1998-2008) has also been one where firms 
have invested in R&D and posted vastly improved patent performance.  However, most of 
the patents of Chinese companies continue to be drawn from China located centres.  Thus, 
the internationalization of R&D appears to be more about learning how to go about 
invention rather than acquiring actual patents in the global locations. 
5.   Conclusions 
We develop and integrative framework that incorporates two key tensions in the 
internationalization effort of emerging market firms, via augmenting the resource base of 
the firm whilst also competing effectively with technologically superior global rivals.  We 
apply this framework to study the internationalization of Chinese firms in the telecom 
equipment sector.   
Oligopolistic rivalry with western MNEs has shaped the growth strategies adopted by the 
three large Chinese telecom equipment firms.  Consequently the emphasis and direction of 
internationalization and resource seeking are also different for each firm.  While Datang has 
not internationalized its investments at all Huawei’s internationalization has been mostly 
westwards and ZTEs mostly to other countries of the South.  Other factors such as state 
support and sponsorship have played a catalysing role but not significantly influenced the 
direction or importance of internationalization.   
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In terms of performance, Huawei’s competition avoidance strategy has been more 
successful than ZTEs, low cost strategy.  This outcome may well change with the global 
recession when most customers will become sensitised to cost issues. 
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